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Standardization Process of Systems
Technologies: Creating a Balance
between Competition and Cooperation
MARC VAN WEGBERG
University of Maastricht, The Netherlands
A Many ﬁrms are experimenting with how to standardize new technologies. They may
use proprietary technologies for their products and services, and let them compete in the market
selection. Alternatively, they can cooperate to jointly set a standard and experiment with
combinations of market process and cooperation. If ﬁrms let the market decide, they can compete
with technologies and need not invest time and eﬀort in hammering out a standard. If they do
incur the costs of negotiated standardization, they may enable end users to realize the beneﬁts of
standards. A hybrid standardization process combines the advantages of both market selection
and negotiated decision making. This paper presents a contingency framework to identify
conditions that will aﬀect the preferred standardization process for vendors who introduce new
technologies. A major contingency that this paper points to is the systemic nature of technologies
in information and communication technology industries. The more systemic the technology is
(in a way to be clariﬁed), the less likely that ﬁrms will establish a hybrid standardization process.
One advantage of decomposing technology systems in smaller components (modules) is that this
approach enables ﬁrms to combine market selection with negotiated selection of standards.
Introduction
Standards and how to establish them are important aspects of business strategy
in the Information and Communication technology (ICT) industries. Firms have
become very sophisticated about their standardization strategies. The Chief
Technology Oﬃcer of a company like SUN has a responsibility for standards.
As a part of their technology and product development strategy, ﬁrms dispatch
staﬀ to standard development organizations. Compatibility standards are import-
ant to ﬁrms because they enable the integration of components into systems.
Technologies deployed in the ICT industries tend to be systems that combine
diﬀerent components such as hardware, software and network infrastructure.
Combining disparate components into workable coherent systems is necessary
to provide information and communication services. This makes the process of
setting standards an important aspect of the value creating processes of innovat-
ing ﬁrms. How to select a standard is a matter of strategic importance. The
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standardization mode is the organizational process through which standards
come about. Sophisticated ﬁrms perceive a broad range of possible standardiza-
tion modes. They are learning how to combine competition and cooperation in
setting standards for ICT technologies.
By an industry standard we mean ‘a set of speciﬁcations to which all
elements of products, processes, formats, or procedures under its jurisdiction
must conform’.1 We focus in this paper on a particular kind of standard, namely
compatibility standards. These speciﬁcations make it possible to connect diﬀerent
components (products or technologies) to establish a system. Systems combine
several diﬀerent components to provide services to end-users. There are positive
network externalities, if the utility of a product (technology) to the user increases
if the number of users of compatible technologies increases. The larger the
number of these users, the more complementary product companies will develop
for them (a so-called indirect network externality), or the more users can
communicate with each other using compatible technologies (a direct network
externality).2 If diﬀerent technologies combine to create a networked externality,
they are called compatible. One way to achieve compatibility between components
is by adopting compatibility standards.
There are diﬀerent modes of organizing a standardization process. Firms
attempt to tailor the standardization process to their business strategy. They can
choose from a menu of modes of organizing a standardization process. Which
standardization mode best serves the interests of the companies involved depends
on various aspects of the situation. What is needed is a contingency approach
to identify the conditions that determine the appropriate standardization mode.
We ﬂesh out the consequences of one major contingency in particular. This
contingency is that the systems technology for which the standard or standards
are intended is suﬃciently modular (a condition that we will explain below).
Within the menu of possible standardization modes, the extreme modes are a
market selection process of standards and a centrally coordinated, industry-wide
choice of standards. In the market selection mode of standards, the product
market decides which incompatible technologies get adopted. Firms submit
their technologies to market selection by introducing products that use these
technologies. Competition in the market place becomes a battle about standards.
Vendors sponsor their preferred technology by using their competition instru-
ments in support of it.3 If a single technology achieves dominance in the market,
it is called a de facto standard. An advantage of this standardization mode is
timely market introduction. Companies introduce products as soon as the
technology is ready for it. A disadvantage of this standardization mode is that
the market may fail to establish a de facto standard (for reasons we discuss later).
As long as the market does not settle on a single standard, there is a loss of
network externalities associated with the industry-wide adoption of a standard.
In a negotiated standardization mode, ﬁrms select a common standard in a
collective decision-making process. There may be a permanent standard setting
body that develops, selects, or imposes a standard. Firms collaborate in this
process either voluntarily (as in an industry consortium) or constrained by law
(when a government body sets standards). If potential rivals coordinate decision
making to set a standard, they will achieve the beneﬁts associated with adopting
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Standardization Process of Systems Technologies 459
a standard. These advantages tend to be summarized by the concept of positive
network externalities. The negotiation process takes time, however, and this will
delay the market introduction. Vendors may participate in a negotiation process
in order to speed it up.4 They may have more urgency that researchers or
government oﬃcials. Politicking by competitive vendors may, however, delay the
negotiations.
In between these standardization modes are increasingly reﬁned hybrid forms.
Examples abound in the data communication industry5 as well as in the
telecommunication industry.6 The new and hybrid standardization modes com-
bine elements from the existing standardization modes with some new
approaches.7 Hybrid standardization modes can take a multitude of forms.
Standardization may occur in coalitions of ﬁrms and other participants that
compete with each other for standard setting.8 Firms may cooperate in an
industry-wide coalition, while already introducing products in the market using
competing versions of a potential standard.9 Firms may sponsor competing
technologies, while trying to develop a compromise standard that combines
elements from the competing technologies.10 Competing groups of ﬁrms and
other organizations may standardize in a formal and open way, by submitting
their proposals to competing standardization bodies.11
By engaging in a hybrid standardization mode, ﬁrms seek to combine the
advantages of the market selection and negotiated modes. The advantage of
cooperating is that ﬁrms create a basis for achieving positive network externalities.
By competing with each other at the same time, they achieve some of the beneﬁts
of the market selection mode. The latter include timely market introduction and
the ability of adopters to choose between alternative technologies and standards.
It may, however, be possible that a hybrid standardization mode combines
instead the disadvantages of the market selection and negotiated standardization
modes. The cooperation that ﬁrms engage in may delay the actual adoption of
new technologies. The competition between ﬁrms may lead to competition
between incompatible technologies, thus wasting potential network externalities.
The possibility that a hybrid standardization mode combines the worst of both
worlds means that it is not always the best solution. This is why a contingency
approach is needed to analyse the choice of standardization mode.
The paper begins with a review of the literature. This lays the basis for our
contingency framework. This paper subsequently uses a game theoretic model
to develop the causal relationships in the explanatory framework. We will focus
on the interplay between three major factors: the competitive interaction of the
ﬁrms, the nature of technology concerned, and the beneﬁts realized by having a
standard. Examples from the ICT industries illustrate the framework.
Determinants of the Choice of Standardization Mode
There are many diﬀerent aspects of a standardization process that can explain
which standardization mode pertains in a given case. For one, the standard
selection mode tends to depend on the industry. Standardization in the computer
industry mainly evolved through the market place12 or through standards
organizations such as the ISO (International Organization for Standardization).
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In telecommunications, oﬃcial standards bodies have deﬁned many standards.
Especially important is the ITU (International Telecommunications Union),
which is a formal treaty organization and run under the auspices of the
United Nations.13 The Internet has pioneered many open standards. These were
incubated in research communities of universities by volunteer organizations
such as the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force).
The 1990s witnessed a lot of experimentation with new standardization
forms and institutions. Many new approaches are hybrid market competition/
negotiation standardization modes. One reason for the experimentation is the
liberalization of telecommunication markets worldwide. Liberalization allowed
entry to take place in hitherto closed markets. This has increased the freedom of
telecom equipment manufacturers and operators to select their suppliers, partners
and technologies.
The theoretical industrial organization literature has analysed in depth how
ﬁrms should use their freedom to standardize. The seminal paper on the choice
of standardization mode in a context with network externalities is that of Farrell
and Saloner.14 This classic paper has a dynamic model, where two ﬁrms choose
a standard between two technologies. These ﬁrms engage in many rounds of
decision making. They experience a positive network externality if they adopt
the same technology, but each favours its own technology to be the one. There
are proﬁt beneﬁts in having a standard, with an additional beneﬁt if one’s own
technology is selected as standard (for example, because of intellectual property
rights on the technology). Both ﬁrms can either adopt a technology unilaterally,
thus letting the market select technologies, or join an industry-wide standard
setting committee where they can propose a technology as a standard. In a
hybrid standardization mode, ﬁrms repeatedly go through rounds of decision
making. Each round begins with both ﬁrms unilaterally deciding whether or not
to adopt their technology for a new product. If neither adopts unilaterally, both
enter into a committee meeting to try to select a standard. This game continues
until either one of them or both unilaterally adopt a technology, or both agree
on a standard in a committee meeting.
Farrell and Saloner15 conclude from their model that the committee unambigu-
ously outperforms the market selection case. The committee ensures that ﬁrms
agree on a standard and realize positive network externalities. Market selection
may be quick, but it runs the risk of ﬁrms adopting competing technologies, in
which case they lose the positive network externalities. The market may fail to
settle on a de facto standard. A hybrid standard selection mechanism that
combines a committee with market selection is always superior to both a pure
committee system and a pure market system. It is a reasonably quick way of
selecting a standard, with a relatively small chance of ﬁrms unilaterally adopting
competing technologies.
The paper by Farrell and Saloner16 shows the pitfall of the negotiated
standardization mode: a conﬂict about which technology to standardize on can
prolong the decision-making process, which creates an economic loss. It also
argues that uncoordinated competitive behaviour by ﬁrms can lead to competi-
tion between technologies and a loss of network externalities. Farrell and
Saloner’s17 results predict that ﬁrms always participate in an industry-wide
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Standardization Process of Systems Technologies 461
standardization committee, but would sometimes undercut their negotiations,
thereby unilaterally adopting their own technology in an investment. This is
surely an interesting result now that we so often observe hybrid systems. It
cannot explain, however, why an industry-wide committee sometimes fails to be
formed, or why ﬁrms participate in a committee with such a commitment that
going alone would no longer be possible. To understand this, we need an
approach that allows ﬁrms to make diﬀerent strategic choices, depending on
the situation. By including other factors in the explanation, besides network
externalities, we develop a contingency approach where contingencies determine
which standardization mode ﬁrms select. This is the objective of the paper.
Modules and Architectures in ICT Industries
The main contingency that we argue aﬀects the choice of standardization mode
is the nature of the systems technology that the standard pertains to. ICT
technologies tend to consist of a system that combines separate modules that
enable a complex pattern of interaction. Modules are separate units with a large
degree of autonomy.18 The degree of modularity is a feature of any kind of
system. Schilling19 deﬁnes it as ‘the degree to which a system’s components can
be separated and recombined . . . with little loss of functionality’. She opines that
though it is diﬃcult to quantify the degree of modularity, it is possible to rank
diﬀerent systems in terms of their degree of modularity.
Modules need to connect together into a complex, interdependent system, for
them to perform useful functions. Complex systems need an architecture, the
complex model that deﬁnes how a system and its modules interact.20 The
architecture deﬁnes interoperability requirements. Interoperability can be deﬁned
as the ability of modules to inter-connect in a way that enhances performance
in a predictable manner. By creating interoperability between diﬀerent modules,
new functions and services are made possible.21 Compatibility standards guaran-
tee a level of interoperability between modules. They do so by laying down
speciﬁcations that, if followed, enable interoperability.
Architectures and modules are loosely coupled if the architecture is ﬂexible as
to which new modules can be integrated and the modules can be integrated in
diﬀerent architectures. The Windows PC architecture has, for instance, integrated
numerous modules in its basic design (e.g. various types of modems), while some
modules are integrated in various architectures, such as the USB bus in Windows
PCs, Apple Macintosh computers and digital cameras. The ﬂexibility of modular
systems enables both the rapid adoption of new technologies and the retention
of old technologies or components in a new architecture.22 Internet telephony is
an example where a modular architecture enables new combinations between
components, pertaining to voice, video and data communication. These new
combinations in turn facilitate service innovations.23 As a result of this ﬂexibility,
modularity tends to reduce switching costs between technologies, at least at the
level of individual components.24 Whenever ﬁrms make an investment in a
technology, they create the liability of switching costs: if they want to switch to
another technology later, they incur switching costs of retooling, retraining and
other costs that they would not have incurred, had they continued with their
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prior technology. Modularity reduces switching costs among others by retaining
components of established technologies, while integrating new elements. These
switching costs have an eﬀect on standardization processes.
Technological Constraints on Organization
Having discussed the degree of modularity and the associated switching costs,
we need to see whether this is a contingency that aﬀects how a standardization
process is organized. The literature on modular systems recognizes the interaction
between modularity (of technology, systems, and products) and organization (of
ﬁrms, networks, or markets). Modular systems enable division of labour between
suppliers and innovators. They tend to call for networks of suppliers and users.25
In case studies of the high-ﬁdelity and stereo systems and personal computer
industries, Langlois and Robertson26 show that if the products are modular,
customers can mix and match components from various suppliers to create the
product variety that suits them best. The need to assemble separate components
does create assembly costs and transaction (information search) costs. Modularity
may raise the ﬁxed costs of developing the system.27
It seems intuitive that a modular system will be associated with a decentralized,
network-like, industry structure. Specialist ﬁrms may supply modules. Generalist
ﬁrms combine these modules to supply products or services. The relationship
between modularity and industry structure may be more complicated, however.28
Within a decentralized network-like organizational structure authority and entre-
preneurship are required to coordinate innovations. This limits the modularity
of the organization structure.29 We can learn from this that even when modules
can be easily integrated in a decomposable technical system, decision making in
the associated industry still needs to be coordinated, which can be costly and
time consuming.
We can extend this argument to the organization of the standard setting
process. Since the 1990s, two aspects of standardization processes in the ICT
industries stand out. One aspect is that technologies in the ICT industries are
perceived to have widely diﬀerent degrees of modularity. Internet technologies,
for instance, are usually considered highly modular. The other aspect is the
evolution of a menu of standardization modes that allows ﬁrms to choose their
preferred mode. In the ICT industries there are many cases of the same ﬁrms
choosing very diﬀerent standardization modes for diﬀerent technologies. Their
choices range from market selection of standards, such as in streaming video
standards, competing groups of standards or architectures, as with the choice
between the SIP and H.323 architectures for Internet telephony, and the case of
negotiated development of the XML markup language in the World Wide Web
consortium.
The point in this article is that these two aspects are interrelated. Where
architectures become more modular, switching costs decrease. The switching
costs in turn aﬀect the preference for the diﬀerent standardization modes. Which
mode ﬁrms choose will also depend, however, on other conditions, notably, the
extent of positive network externalities that can be realized and the competitive
game play between the ﬁrms.
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Standardization Process of Systems Technologies 463
The pioneering paper to link the nature of a technology to the standardization
mode is by Choi30 who explores the link between timing, switching costs and
standardization mode in a paper on experimentation and learning. If ﬁrms do
not standardize initially, they can experiment with diﬀerent technologies. Once
they discover which of these works best, the ﬁrm that adopted the (ex post)
inferior technology switches to the ex post superior technology. This leads to de
facto standardization. If, however, the ﬁrm that experimented with the (ex post)
inferior technology has high switching costs, it may not switch. A standard does
not emerge, therefore, and an inferior technology is utilized. Again, as in Farrell
and Saloner,31 the market may fail to establish a de facto standard. Choi32
succeeds in explaining why. The switching costs make it too costly for ﬁrms to
switch to a standard, even when there is consensus about which technology
should be the industry standard. If the ﬁrms choose a standard ex ante, for
example in a negotiation process, they would not incur switching costs, and
would certainly realize the positive network externalities of adopting a standard.
They may, however, choose the ex post inferior standard. According to Choi’s
approach, the choice of standard selection mode is a choice between the value
of experimentation (an advantage of market selection) and positive network
externalities (an advantage of central coordination).
The papers by Farrell and Saloner33 and Choi34 explain when the market
selection mode fails to converge on a de facto standard. Firms take uncoordinated
decisions ex ante and they may be unable to renege on them ex post because of
the switching costs. This suggests how companies can achieve a beneﬁcial hybrid
standardization mode. Let ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent technologies ex ante, select a
consensus standard subsequently, and allow them to switch to the consensus
standard ex post by using modular system technologies with low switching costs.
Where we need to modify Choi’s35 approach is that the process of choosing a
technology to standardize on takes time. This presents vendors with the need to
choose between becoming active now and standardize later, or standardize ﬁrst
and become active later. For Choi, this point is less relevant, as he focuses on
end users, the potential adopters of given (but initially not entirely understood)
technologies. To understand the timing aspect of the standardization mode we
need to consider the competitive game play between vendors.
Competitive Game Play between Vendors
To analyse how economic agents choose to organize a standardization process,
we focus on a speciﬁc kind of competitive interaction. We study cases where a
new technology is applied to a new product that substitutes for an existing
product. Both products are services with network features. The Internet and
mobile telecommunication have, for example, given rise to innovations that
substitute for existing data communication and voice communication services.36
A supplier who uses the new technology reduces the revenues of the established
supplier of an existing product. The latter may cooperate with the former to
develop an industry standard. The industry standard would create compatibility
between the various products of the existing and new suppliers.37 Their ﬁnal
customers experience a positive network externality by being able to communicate
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with each other, whichever supplier they use. The suppliers can internalise parts
of these gains of consumer utility into enhanced proﬁts.
Standardization has an eﬀect on entry. In their study of the semiconductor
industry in the 1980s, Kogut et al.38 found that the greater the ability of an
established ﬁrm to set standards, the more likely that it is a desirable partner for
entrants. Moreover, the more centralized networks are around incumbent ﬁrms,
the more entry would occur. Entrants are deterred by uncertainty about which
technology will become the standard. The more centralized the network is, the
more likely that the central player can set an industry standard, which in turn
invites entry. In his study of the Swiss international trade, Blind39 found that
international standards open domestic markets for foreign importers and tend
to reduce Swiss net exports.
When established ﬁrms and newcomers compete in a case where standardiza-
tion beneﬁts exist, the ﬁrms face two decisions. First, a new supplier needs to
choose the timing of entry. It may enter the market early, using the new
technology, or it may wait till an industry standard is developed. Participating
in a standard development process tends to be time consuming. Early entry
speeds up the revenue stream and may create a competitive early move advantage.
If a standard emerges later, it does have to switch to the standardized technology.
This calls for switching costs. These costs consist of, for example, adding
interfaces, updating hardware and software, and installing gateways. The ﬁrm
can avoid these switching costs by entering the market later, using the updated,
standardized technology. The newcomer therefore faces a trade-oﬀ between early
revenues and later switching costs. In a time–market evaluation of diﬀerent
investment proposals, the need to standardize can be considered a liability in
estimating the time-to-market of a new project.40
An established supplier has to choose whether to cooperate with the newcomer
to develop an industry standard. If it does, the ﬁrms make it possible to
realize positive network externalities. Whether positive network externalities for
consumers translate into proﬁts for the suppliers depends on how they compete
in the product market. If a standard could make the services of both ﬁrms better
substitutes, the resulting price competition between the vendors might reduce
their proﬁts.41 Standardizing on compatibility features does leave room for
diﬀerentiating the products. An important aspect of standardization is, therefore,
the extent to which it would reduce product diﬀerentiation, increase price
competition and reduce proﬁts.
Participating in a standard development process calls for an established vendor
to switch to the standardized technology. Doing so, it incurs switching costs. An
alternative strategy can be to update its technology, imitating somewhat the new
technology of the entrant. The ﬁrm is likely to respond to the innovative entry,
especially given the commitment and the public nature of it when a rival
introduces a proprietary technology.42 This strategy leads to a market with
competing technologies. The result is that some positive network externalities
are not realized. An established supplier therefore faces the trade-oﬀ between,
on the one hand, positive network externalities and, on the other hand, a costly
standard setting process and incurring switching costs.
To analyse how vendor competition aﬀects the standardization mode, we thus
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need to pay attention to the duration of a standardization process, the switching
costs, the eﬀect of externalities and standardization on proﬁts and the link
between standardization and entry. We next explore a game theoretic analysis to
develop an explanatory framework for the selection of standardization mode.
The Model
We model decision making by ﬁrms to explore the basic forces that give rise to
these scenarios. There are two ﬁrms, the incumbent ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1, and an entrant,
ﬁrm 2. The market has two time periods. First, ﬁrm 2 (the newcomer) decides
whether or not to enter the product market in period 1. This stage determines
product market competition (monopoly or duopoly) and pay-oﬀs in period 1.
Then, both ﬁrms decide whether or not to cooperate in period 1 to develop a
standard for period 2. There is only cooperation in period 1 if both ﬁrms agree
to that. If they cooperate, they both switch to that standard in period 2. Adopting
the standard creates a positive network externality for their ﬁnal customers.
Cooperating is costly for the ﬁrms and so is switching to a diﬀerent technology.
Firm 2 can avoid the switching cost by delaying its entry until period 2. Firm 1
can only avoid it by not cooperating for an industry standard in the ﬁrst place.
The penalty for not cooperating is the loss of a positive network externality in
period 2.
The interplay of these two decision makers and their trade-oﬀs suggests that in
the simplest case, ﬁrms face three scenarios with their associated standardization
modes:
Ω Scenario 1 (competing technologies): the newcomer innovates early with a
product that substitutes for or competes with the established ﬁrm. The
established ﬁrm reacts subsequently by improving its technology by means of
imitation. Customers have to choose between competing technologies, and fail
to realize a network externality.
Ω Scenario 2 (hybrid standardization): the newcomer introduces its innovation
early, and soon initiates cooperation with the established ﬁrm to develop a
standard. Both ﬁrms switch to the industry standard once it is there. From
that point on, they again compete in the market, but this time they realize a
positive network externality for their ﬁnal customers.
Ω Scenario 3 (negotiated standardization): the newcomer delays its market
introduction and cooperates with the established ﬁrm to develop an industry
standard. Once the standard is there, the newcomer enters the market and
both ﬁrms use the standardized technology for their product. The ﬁnal
customers choose between both suppliers. They realize a positive network
externality among themselves, independently from the identity of their supplier.
We refer to these scenarios as S1, S2 and S3, respectively. Figure 1 summarizes
the sequences of choices and the resulting scenarios.
We use the following terminology for the game:
Ω Monopoly proﬁt of the incumbent ﬁrm 1: a.
Ω Duopoly proﬁts when ﬁrms 1 and 2 compete in the product market in period
1 without adopting a standard: b.
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Figure 1. Sequence of moves.
Ω Duopoly proﬁts when ﬁrms 1 and 2 compete in the product market in periods
1 or 2 with compatible standardized technology: bòc.
Ω Switching cost in period 2 for ﬁrm 2 from own technology to jointly developed
standard: d
2
.
Ω Switching cost in period 2 for ﬁrm 1 from own technology to jointly developed
standard: d
1
.
Ω Payoﬀ of ﬁrm 2 in period 2 when no standard was created: b.
Ω Payoﬀ of ﬁrm 1 in period 2 when ﬁrm 2 entered in period 1, no standard was
created, and ﬁrm 1 unilaterally imitates aspects of ﬁrm 2’s technology: bòe.
Ω Cooperation costs per ﬁrm in period 1: f.
Ω Discount factor of period 2 towards period 1: .
These parameters allow us to explore the eﬀect of how much the positive
externalities increase proﬁts (c), how costly it is for either ﬁrm to switch to the
standard (d
1
, resp. d
2
), how intense product market competition is (b), how much
ﬁrm 1 can increase its proﬁts by unilaterally imitating the entrant’s technology
(e), how costly the negotiation process is ( f ) in terms of man power and other
expenses, and ﬁnally, how high ﬁrms value the revenues of period 2 (). Table 1
contains the pay-oﬀ matrix:
In order to focus on interesting cases, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: Duopoly competition decreases and compatibility increases proﬁts:
2b\a\2bò2c.
Assumption 2: The gain of compatibility outweighs the switching costs: d
1
\c,
d
2
\c.
Assumption 3: If ﬁrm 1 imitates ﬁrm 2 rather than cooperating with it, its gain
in period 2 is relatively small: 0\e\c.
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Table 1. Pay-oﬀ matrix of the two-stage game
Pay-oﬀs (ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2) Firm 2
Enter in period 1? (1st stage)
Yes No
Cooperate with ﬁrm 1 in period 1? Cooperate with ﬁrm 1 in period
(2nd stage) 1?
Yes No Yes No
Firm 1: Yes bñfò(bòc–d
1
), bò(bòe), bòb añfò(bòcñd
1
), aòb, b
cooperate with bñfò(bòcñd
2
) ñfò(bòc)
ﬁrm 2 in period
1? No bò(bòe), bòb bò(bòe), bòb aòb, b aòb, b
Solving the Second Stage, the Choice of Cooperating
There are two kinds of second stage of the game, depending on whether ﬁrm 2
decided to enter in period 1, the ﬁrst stage of the game. If ﬁrm 2 did not enter
in period 1, ﬁrm 1 cooperates with it if añfò(bòcñd
1
)[aòb, that is, if
c[fòd
1
(1)
Firm 2 cooperates with ﬁrm 1, if ñfò(bòc)[b, that is, if
c[f (2)
This Nash equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient, compared to non-cooperation, if
añfò(bòcñd
1
)[aòb and ñfò(bòc)[b. These conditions hold if and
only if conditions (1) and (2) hold. Taken together, with d
1
[0, these conditions
imply that both ﬁrms cooperate to develop an industry standard if and only if
condition (1) holds. In that case, scenario 3 applies. If condition (1) does not
hold, the ﬁrms compete in period 2 (a variant of scenario 1, competing
technologies, restricted to the second period).
If ﬁrm 2 did enter in period 1, then ﬁrm 1 will also want to cooperate if
bñfò(bòcñd
1
)[bò(bòe), that is (cñd
1
)[eòf or:
(cñe)[fòd
1
(3)
This implies that the discounted beneﬁt from developing joint compatibility
versus unilateral imitation, (cñe), should exceed the coordination and adjust-
ment cost towards the new standard. The condition for ﬁrm 2 to accept
cooperation is: bñfò(bòcñd
2
)[bòb, that is:
c[fòd
2
(4)
Only if both conditions hold, that is, if c[max{ fòd
1
òe, fòd
2
}, will ﬁrms
1 and 2 cooperate in period 1 and switch to the standard in period 2 (scenario
2, hybrid standardization). The outcome where neither cooperates is always a
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Nash equilibrium (in the subgame where ﬁrm 2 entered in period 1). The payoﬀs
for both are in this case: (bò(bòe), bòb). The cooperation equilibrium is
Pareto eﬃcient, compared to the non-cooperation Nash equilibrium, if
bñfò(bòcñd
1
)[bò(bòe) and bñfò(bòcñd
2
)[bòb. These two con-
ditions are satisﬁed if and only if: (cñd
1
)[fòe and (cñd
2
)[f. In other
words, the cooperation equilibrium is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if conditions
(3) and (4) pertain. If ﬁrm 2 enters in period 1, both ﬁrms will cooperate on a
standard in period 1 and adopt it in period 2, if and only if:
c[max{ fòd
1
òe, fòd
2
}. (5)
If the condition holds, scenario 2 applies. If condition (5) does not hold and
ﬁrm 2 enters in period 1, then the two ﬁrms compete in period 2 (scenario 1,
competing technologies).
Table 2. Results of the second stage (the choice of cooperation mode)
Did ﬁrm 2
enter in period Do 1 and 2 cooperate Outcome
1 (1st stage)? (2nd stage)? (scenario) Pay-oﬀs (ﬁrm 1, ﬁrm 2)
No Yes, if c[fòd
1
3 añfò(bòcñd
1
),
ñfò(bòc)
No, if c\fòd
1
1 aòb, b
Yes Yes, if c [ max{ fòd
1
òe, 2 bñfò(bòc–d
1
),
fòd
2
} bñfò(bòcñd
2
)
No, if c\max{ fòd
1
òe, 1 bò(bòe), bòb
fòd
2
}
Solving the First Stage of the Game
Anticipating the outcome of the second stage of the game (the results in Table 2),
ﬁrm 2 makes a choice about entry in period 1, in the ﬁrst stage of the game. The
outcome depends on the parameters. For example, if c[max{ fòd
1
òe,
fòd
2
} and c[fòd
1
, ﬁrm 2 compares its pay-oﬀs when it enters in period 1
(bñfò(bòcñd
2
)) to the pay-oﬀs when it does not enter (ñfò(bòc)). The
former exceeds the latter if b/[d
2
. If that condition applies, scenario 2 applies:
ﬁrm 2 enters the market in period 1 and cooperates with ﬁrm 1 to set an
industry standard. If either e[0 or d
2
[d
1
, it holds that max{ fòd
1
òe,
fòd
2
}[fòd
1
.
Table 3 combines the results from the ﬁrst and second stage to link the
parameters to the ﬁnal outcome.
This gives the following outcome, the core result of the model:
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Table 3. Final outcome (scenario) of the game
Additional Does ﬁrm 2 enter Outcome
Condition condition in period 1? (Scenario)
c[max{ fòd
1
òe, fòd
2
}[fòd
1
b/[d
2
Yes 2
b/\d
2
No 3
Max{ fòd
1
òe, fòd
2
}[c[fòd
1
bòf[c Yes 1
bòf\c No 3
Max{ fòd
1
òe, fòd
2
}[fòd
1
[c Yes 1
Proposition 1: Subgame perfect equilibrium of the game:
Firm 2 enters
in period 1 
Yes
Both cooperate (S2) if dc[max{ fòdd
1
òde, fòdd
2
}[fòdd
1
and b/d[d
2
No cooperation (S1) if either max{ fòdd
1
òde, fòdd
2
}[fòdd
1
[dc
or {max{ fòdd
1
òde, fòdd
2
}[dc[fòdd
1
and bòf[dc}
No
Both cooperate (S3) if either {dc[max{ fòdd
1
òde, fòdd
2
}[fòdd
1
and d
2
[b/d} or {max{ fòdd
1
òde, fòdd
2
}[dc[fòdd
1
and dc[bòf }
No cooperationñdominated by scernario 1
Results of the Model
Proposition 1 identiﬁes conditions that are conducive to a hybrid standardization
mode (scenario 2):
Ω the ﬁxed costs of bargaining for standard setting are suﬃciently small,
Ω the switching costs of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 are suﬃciently small, and
Ω the gains to ﬁrm 1 for going it alone and imitating ﬁrm 2 in period 2 should
be suﬃciently small.
A modular architecture tends to have low switching costs. By implication, it
tends to support hybrid standardization modes.
To create intuition about these results, we consider the special case where
bargaining is costless ( fó0), but switching costs are real (0\d
1
and 0\d
2
). If
fó0 and given the assumption 2, d
1
\c and d
2
\c, we know that fòd
1
\c
and fòd
2
\c. Figure 2 shows the results.
Figure 2. Two possible outcomes when fó0.
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If the established ﬁrm has high switching costs, the outcome is either competing
technologies (S1) or negotiated standardization (S3). Which of these two out-
comes prevails, depends on the relative importance of positive network externalit-
ies. If the gain of compatibility c is relatively high (i.e. c[b/), high switching
costs by at least one ﬁrm favour scenario 3, negotiated standardization (see
Figure 2, case 1). If, on the other hand, the gain of compatibility is relatively
low (c\b/), then high switching costs of ﬁrm 1 support scenario 1, competing
technologies (see case 2 in Figure 2). Firm 1 will not switch from its existing
technology to a new one, because of its high switching costs and low gain from
compatibility.
Low switching costs d
1
and d
2
tend to support scenario 2 (hybrid standardiza-
tion). Highly modular technologies tend to support hybrid standardization
modes, therefore. Highly integrated systems technologies, on the other hand,
tend to lead to either market selection of standards or ex ante negotiated
standard selection. If we put these results, of proposition 1, Table 3 and
Figure 2, in words, what we get is an explanatory framework of the mode of
standardization.
Choosing the Degree of Modularity
In the model above the switching costs have been taken as given. This follows
from our approach to explore technology as a contingency factor for the choice
of standardization mode. For an innovating ﬁrm, however, various aspects of
technology are choice variables. This would suggest that the ﬁrms can inﬂuence
the level of switching costs. This choice will have various constraints, however.
Individual ICT technologies tend to be part of systems, most of whose character-
istics may have been determined in the past. Systemic decisions tend to require
the cooperation of ﬁrms. The network of ﬁrms may be free to choose, but
individual ﬁrms may be severely limited in their ability to choose technology
characteristics. Within these constraints, however, new technologies do present
ﬁrms with an ability to choose.
The two ﬁrms in our model have diﬀerent interests with respect to switching
costs. If the externality proﬁt bonus is relatively high, case 1 applies (see Figure
2). Only scenarios 2 and 3 apply. The entrant would prefer scenario 2 to hold,
while the incumbent ﬁrm would prefer scenario 1. The entrant, ﬁrm two, would
want switching costs to be as low as possible. Low switching costs enable it to
enter the market early (in period 1) and switch to the standard in period two to
realize the externality bonus (scenario 2). Firm 1, however, would like to raise
switching costs to the point that ﬁrm 2 abstains from early entry (scenario 3).
The incumbent ﬁrm would not want its switching costs to be less than cñe, or
those of ﬁrm 2 to be less than b/. With these high switching costs, it can delay
ﬁrm 2’s entry into the market to period 2, thus protecting its monopoly proﬁt a
by one period. Firm 2 plays along with this strategy, because its wants to be able
to realize the externality bonus c. If this bonus is relatively high, it has to wait
with entry till the standard is set. This situation would justify the feeling,
expressed occasionally, that established ﬁrms may prolong standardization nego-
tiations in order to protect current revenue ﬂows.43
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If the externality proﬁt bonus is relatively small, case 2 applies (see Figure 2).
We argue that in this case the interests of both ﬁrms can be aligned. Firm 2 will
enter the market early any way (only scenarios 1 and 2 apply). Switching costs
only aﬀect what will happen in period 2. The entrant would beneﬁt from having
switching costs as low as possible. If the entrant’s switching costs are high, it will
not switch to the standard in period 2, and the positive externality bonus is not
realized. Firm 1 will consent to reducing switching costs, if the proﬁt of having
a standard (óbñfò(bòcñd
1
), see Table 2), exceed the proﬁts of progressing
unilaterally (óbò(bòe)). With the assumption that case 2 applies (c\b/),
this condition means that eòd
1
\c\b/ and f\(cñeñd
1
). Firm 1 will thus
accept a lower level of switching costs, if the costs of negotiating a standard f
are low, the externality proﬁt bonus c is suﬃciently high, yet low enough for case
2 to apply (c\b/), and the proﬁt enhancement from unilaterally imitating
elements of ﬁrm 2’s technology into its own service e is suﬃciently low.
These results give the following outcome:
Proposition 2: The two ﬁrms will only consent to standardize on a highly modular
technology system, leading to a hybrid standardization mode, if the following
conditions hold:
Ω The payoﬀ e when ﬁrm 1 unilaterally imitates elements of ﬁrm 2’s technology
into its own service is suﬃciently low (eòd
1
\c\b/).
Ω The externality proﬁt bonus c is suﬃciently high, yet low enough that the
entrant ﬁrm 2 will not postpone entry in order to realize the positive externality
(eòd
1
\c\b/).
Ω The costs of negotiating a standard f are low ( f\(cñeñd
1
)).
Ω The discount rate  is relatively high.
Interpretation of these Results
The propositions indicate conditions that have an eﬀect on the standardization
mode. Together these conditions form an explanatory framework for the mode
of standardization in a systems technology.
Ω Network externalities: The higher the potential is for positive network external-
ities (parameter c) created by new communication services for ﬁnal customers,
the more likely that the standardization process is either a hybrid or a
negotiated process. If a standard would make the services of both ﬁrms better
substitutes, the resulting price competition between the vendors might reduces
their proﬁts. The bonus c would be small or negative, and only the scenario
of competing technologies would apply.
Ω Intensity of competition: The more intense the product market competition is
between the new and existing ﬁrms, the lower the duopoly proﬁt b will be.
That would make an outcome of competing technologies (scenario 1) less
likely. Firms would cooperate to set a standard for period 2 (scenario 3), and,
if switching costs are low, they would compete in period 1 (scenario 2).
Ω Imitation: If the established ﬁrm, ﬁrm 1, can imitate its new rival, ﬁrm 2, and
if that strongly increases its proﬁts in the future (the parameter e), then ﬁrm
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1 is less likely to standardize. The larger it is, the more it can achieve network
externalities by itself, without any cooperation with ﬁrm 2.
Ω Switching costs: If the new ﬁrm is more ﬂexible than the existing one (d
2
low
and d
1
high), the existing ﬁrm’s high switching cost makes hybrid standardiza-
tion less likely. The outcome would be a pure approach of either competing
technologies (if the gain of compatibility is fairly small) or negotiated standard-
ization (if the compatibility gain is high).
Ω Bargaining costs: If bargaining costs f are suﬃciently high, scenario 1 prevails,
with competing technologies. Conditions that reduce bargaining costs are
routines of collaboration, institutions and the incidence of prior contacts
between the ﬁrms involved that create trust among them.44 These conditions
would reduce the bargaining costs and make a negotiated or hybrid standard-
ization mode more likely. If the bargaining process could be speeded up, this
would mean in our model that period 2 starts earlier. That is, the discount
factor  increases, the factor b/ decreases and it becomes more likely that
case 1 arises rather than case 2 (see Figure 2), and in case 1 scenario 3 becomes
more likely than scenario 2. The hybrid scenario becomes less likely when
negotiations lead to a standard more quickly. The entrant is more likely to
wait to set a standard ﬁrst and enter later (scenario 3) when the standard
setting period is rather brief.
Cases
At this point, we may ask whether these three scenarios have examples in reality
and moreover, do these cases appear to be consistent with our explanation
suggested above? Some well-known examples do indeed seem to be consistent
with our description. Table 4 summarizes these cases. While they do not prove
the model, they do suggest that the model is on to something.
The long and winding road to high-deﬁnition television in Japan, Europe
and the USA shows high switching costs and high potential gains (network
externalities) in combination with centralized, negotiated selection (if not devel-
opment and adoption) of a standard.45 This outcome is consistent with the
situation in case 1 (relatively high externality proﬁt bonus), with high switching
costs, where a negotiated standardization mode is predicted.
Using the modular Internet architecture leads to innovatory services, such as
Internet telephony, that have lower switching costs than more highly integrated
technologies such as traditional circuit-switched telephony.46 These Internet
services tend to have relatively high indirect externalities: they need large networks
of users to achieve economies of scale and to attract revenues, such as advertising
revenues. Moreover, users experience direct network beneﬁts by being able to
communicate with each other, even if they participate in diﬀerent networks.
Moreover, the revenues on Internet telephony are either zero or small and thus
relatively small compared to the direct network externalities. The condition of
low switching costs coupled with the direct network externalities of telecommuni-
cation services suggest that case 1 applies, with a prediction that hybrid standard-
ization prevails (see Figure 2). This appears consistent with the standardization
process of Internet telephony. There is a lot of formal development going on of
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Table 4. Examples of the three standardization scenarios
Case
Personal computer High-Deﬁnition
oﬃce software Internet telephony Television (by 1992)
Technologies, File formats (Lotus, H.323 HDTV
standards dBase ﬁle formats) SIP (Session Initiation
Protocol)
Network externality Direct: ﬁle exchange Direct externality: High, indirect
between people communication (economies of scale in
Indirect: ﬁle exchange content production)
between
complementary
software programs
Switching costs, Designing ﬁle Modular architecture, High, coordinated use
modules compatibility into a incl. a layered of new studio
program is costly. network architecture equipment,
For a user to switch transmission systems,
tends to require new receivers
complementary
programs
Standardization None ITU FCC (in the U.S.)
bodies IETF
Standard setting Competing Hybrid process Negotiated process
process technologies
Source Gandal49; Lange55; Vercoulen & van Farrell & Shapiro45
Shurmer & Swann49 Wegberg46
platform architectures, such as the H.323 architecture for Internet telephony by
the ITU. There are, moreover, collaborative activities in forums and consortia.47
These consist of joint eﬀorts to develop technologies for the formal process, and
improve inter-operability of services. While negotiations have been taking place,
the provision of actual Internet services has expanded too, since the ﬁrst such
service operated by Vocaltec in 1996.48
File formats of software programs in the market for PC oﬃce software
developed into de facto standards. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Lotus
ﬁle format developed into a de facto standard for spreadsheets and database
programs.49 Gandal50 shows that users valued the direct and indirect network
externality that results from using software (spreadsheets and database manage-
ment programs) that was ﬁle compatible with the Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet
format.51 In a simulation, calibrated to real market data, Shurmer and Swann52
show that several market features including network externalities, which were
especially large for Lotus, can best explain the diﬀusion of the Lotus spreadsheet
and its dominance over the alternatives Supercalc and Framework. In the market
for database management programs, direct network externalities appear not be
large.53
In both studies,54 complementary products that support a particular de facto
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standard create indirect network externalities. A recent empirical study also
supports the view that the extent to which users adopt complementary products
tends to drive diﬀusion of software programs (e.g. computer operating systems).55
These complementary products also create switching costs. It is costly for
software developers to integrate compatibility with a particular ﬁle format into
their product, as Gandal assumes,56 and users need to buy new complementary
goods, should they switch to a product with an incompatible ﬁle format. If proﬁt
margins are relatively high (high b/), if rivals can copy newcomer’s best features
(high e), and switching costs are high, then case 2 in Figure 2 suggests that
scenario 1 applies with competing technologies. This may account for the lack
of negotiated work on format standards for oﬃce software, even though, from a
users’ perspective, network externalities are high.
These cases show that the standardization modes identiﬁed in the paper exist.
They show that they tend to arise in situations similar to the ones identiﬁed by
our propositions.
There are of course many examples that do not ﬁt quite nicely into the three
scenarios in Table 4. One scenario may, for example, give way to another one. If
a negotiated standard fails to deliver, the industry consensus behind it may
disintegrate. Alternatives may come to be developed, and the situation may slip
into one with competing technologies. There is, for example, some dissatisfaction
in Europe with WAP (Wireless Application Protocol) technology. Service pro-
viders in Europe such as KPN of the Netherlands switched to NTT DoCoMo’s
Japanese i-Mode technology as an alternative.
Another intermediate case is when ﬁrms that appear to lose out in a situation
of competing technologies may band together in an eﬀort to set an industry
standard. The result may be a switch to a hybrid or negotiated standard setting.
For example, there are various providers of incompatible instant messaging
services. The uncontested market leader is America Online (AOL), with its own
proprietary instant messaging network and technology. At about 131 million
registered members, it as a market share of 80%.57 Several providers of instant
messaging services have joined together in a consortium to develop a standard,
the IMPP, Instant Messaging and Presence Protocol. AOL seems not to particip-
ate actively, but has pledged to adopt the standard once it is there.
Conclusion
The general point of the paper is to show the strong link between two features
that many network services have: modular technologies with low switching costs
and hybrid standardization processes. More generally, the degree of modularity
of a system’s technology is a contingency factor for the choice of the mode of
standardization. The model is abstracted to demonstrate this point. Just a
few conditions of standards (their eﬀects on switching costs, externalities and
bargaining costs) suﬃce to explain in one simple setting many basic character-
istics of standardization processes.
The wider story that comes out of this discussion is this. In the ICT industries,
vendors are well aware of the strategic potential of standards. They invest
resources, people and money, in developing and adopting standards. They
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participate in standardization bodies. One way to get a preferred standard
adopted is to inﬂuence the process that leads to a standard. In the liberalized
ICT industries, there are many diﬀerent opportunities for ﬁrms to choose how
and with whom to set a standard. A hybrid standardization process appears an
appealing route when it combines the advantages of market selection and
negotiated standardization modes. That was indeed the original insight in the
seminal paper by Farrell and Saloner.58 The hybrid process may also, however,
combine the disadvantages of the market selection and negotiated standardiza-
tion modes. It is only in certain conditions that the hybrid mode indeed appears
the preferred route for ﬁrms. In choosing a standardization mode, ﬁrms balance
between imperatives of the competitive environment and constraints from the
systems technology that the standard refers to. Our main ﬁnding is that the
higher the switching costs between technologies are for the vendors, the less
willing they are to engage in a hybrid mode.
This analysis helps understand one advantage that the Internet oﬀers to
innovations with network characteristics. The Internet has stimulated open
standards and modular systems technologies, with low switching costs. One
advantage of this approach is that it facilitates hybrid standardization modes. It
makes it possible for ﬁrms to combine the advantages of market selection of
standards (timely market introduction and choice between alternative technolo-
gies) with negotiated standardization (to achieve positive network externalities).
The era is over where negotiated standardization processes lasted for many years
and were unresponsive to business needs and where negotiated processes take
time, they have to be justiﬁed.59 Vendors and potential users do not need to
accept it if the market fails to provide them with a de facto standard. The
possibilities for cooperation have increased and cooperation need not stand in
the way of early market introduction of new products.
In the context of case studies, it will be diﬃcult to measure directly the costs
and revenues that drive the standardization mode, notably the switching costs,
bargaining costs and positive externalities. However, one can elicit opinions
about whether these conditions increased or decreased over a time period. The
propositions above can be interpreted dynamically: an increase of the switching
costs and other conditions tends to make a particular outcome (a hybrid
standardization mode) more likely. The model can therefore predict changes of
the standardization mode within the function of changes in perceived levels of
switching cost, bargaining costs and externalities.
Future work can go in two directions. First, it may be possible to develop
more detailed models, with more powerful (less intuitive) ideas. There are many
individual examples where the preferred standardization mode appears to evolve
over time. Firms may change their preferences for how to get to a standard.
More expanded models might be able to generate these results. It may also be a
worthwhile route to open up some black box in the model. These include aspects
of standards and the compatibility choice, which have already been discussed
elsewhere, albeit not in the present context. These include aspects of technology
(by identifying modular components), the bargaining process, networking
between ﬁrms that jointly control a systems technology, the entry process (e.g.
continuous time), the research process (uncertainty, experimentation, externalit-
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ies), intellectual property rights on technologies, competitive pre-emptive moves,
consumer utility when consumers experience positive network externalities, and
the institutional and regulatory context. Integrating these literatures in the model
could be meaningful subsequent steps. Second, game theoretic analyses beneﬁt
from more intensive interaction with case studies on how standards actually got
selected. Explicitly incorporating each other’s approach can be a stepping-stone
towards more fruitful exchange of views.
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